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FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL MISSTATED BY GALLEGOS 
The following corrections are made to misstatements of fact set forth in Gallegos' 
Brief in order to prevent this Court from considering the parties' arguments in a 
misleading context: 
1. In an apparent effort to supplement the Findings of the trail court and 
enlarge this Court's reasonable perception of the extent of the physical trespass, at page 3 
in their Brief, Gallegos state that "Lloyds constructed their home in such a fashion that it 
encroached approximately 38f on to the Gallegos' adjacent lot." That is not accurate. As 
more accurately stated by Gallegos in their Trial Brief (R. 200), and agreed by Lloyds in 
their Trial Brief (R.268), "The physical encroachment of the home itself is approximately 
6 to 8 feet over the property line." There was no Finding by the trial court as to what, if 
any, setbacks were legally required on the side lots of the adjoining parcels, nor was there 
any Finding to the effect that the encroachment was anywhere near 38 feet. The trial 
judge did exercise his equitable powers to order Lloyds to purchase and preserve an 
undeveloped strip of 38 feet wide of the adjacent Gallegos lot to assure Gallegos a buffer 
of undisturbed property. (See Transcript of June 28, 2006 hearing at page 5.) 
Nevertheless, the physically encroaching trespass is acknowledged by both parties to have 
been limited to "6 to 8 feet." 
2. Again departing from the express language of the Findings, Gallegos 
erroneously declared that the trial court found that "Lloyds committed the intentional tort 
of trespass" (Gallegos Brief at page 5). Rather, the trial court found that the Lloyds "were 
1 
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negligent in going forward with the construction of their home as staked" (Finding No. 
16) and "[i]n disregarding the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan, the Lloyds intended 
to build their home in such a way that resulted in the unlawful invasion of the Gallegos' 
property." (Finding No. 20). Neither of those Findings accuse Lloyds of committing an 
intentional trespass tort. Instead, Judge Kennedy affirmatively stated that "the Court did 
not find by clear and convincing evidence that the actions and/or omissions of the Lloyds 
were the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct 
that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward the rights of the Gallegos." 
(Finding No. 30). 
3. Gallegos correctly acknowledged that the Lloyds consistently from early in 
the litigation admitted to the fact of the physical encroachment, and the consistent 
acknowledgment throughout that the proceedings that the encroachment constituted a 
trespass. However, at no time have Lloyds declared that such trespass was intentional as 
asserted at page 15 of Gallegos' Brief.1 The issue of the intentional nature of the 
encroachment was raised for the first time by Gallegos just weeks before trial when they 
1
 Without citing any legal support, Gallegos assert that all trespass is intentional. 
Such a declaration is contrary to the longstanding law of Utah {Thomas v. Blythe, 137 P. 
396, 398 (Utah 1913) (where sheep were negligently driven across the land of another); 
Winters v. Turner, 278 P. 816, 819 (Utah 1929) ( where cattle were negligently allowed to 
graze on a neighboring parcel); Sunrise Valley v. Norton, Clip Copy, 2006 WL 1720734 
(D. Utah) (where defendant unintentionally removed 43,000 cubic feet of gravel from a 
neighbors parcel); and other western jurisdictions {Parks Hiway Enterprises v. CEM 
Leasing, 995 P.2d 657 (Alaska 2000); Lofland v. Sedgwick County, 996 P.2d 334 (Kan. 
App. 1999); Pruitt v. Douglas County, 66 P.3d 1111 (Wash. App. 2003)). 
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were granted leave to amend their Complaint to seek an award of punitive damages 
against Lloyds. That effort was unsuccessful. 
ARGUMENT 
1. There is No Support in This or Other Jurisdictions for the Awarding of 
Attorneys Fees as Consequential Damages for a Trespass Claim. 
Gallegos acknowledge the absolute absence of Utah law supporting the trial 
court's award of attorney's fees as consequential damages for a trespass action. Neither 
were they able to cite any precedential support from other jurisdictions. Utah courts are 
recognized to have given consistent support to the "American Rule" which precludes the 
award of attorneys fees "unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award." Stewart 
v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1992). 
The appropriate measure of damages under a trespass claim, acknowledged by 
Gallegos in both of their Complaints, and their Trial Brief, is limited to the "diminished 
market value of the property plus consequential losses to the use of the land or from 
discomfort or annoyance to the possessor." Walker Drug Company, Inc. v. La Sal Oil 
Company, 972 P.2d 1238, 1246 (Utah 1998). Correctly, Gallegos did not request an 
attorneys fee element of damages as an appendage to their trespass claim, and expressed 
some discomfort with the trial court's oral decision to award the same as consequential 
damages. (See Transcript of June 28, 2006 hearing at page 7 and Transcript of November 
2, 2006 hearing at page 25). Instead, Gallegos amended their Complaint to seek punitive 
damages under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-18-1, where additional damages may be 
3 
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awarded in response to "wilful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct" as 
shown by "clear and convincing evidence." 
The trial court could not find that Gallegos had met this high standard required to 
award punitive damages, but he apparently wanted to give the Gallegos an additional 
amount to cover their expended costs of litigation (see Transcript of June 28, 2006 
hearing at page 7 lines 5 through 12). Without statutory or case law support, Judge 
Kennedy attempted to create new law for this and other jurisdictions by creating a new 
lesser standard for awarding attorneys fees in trespass cases. That prerogative is properly 
left to the legislature. 
Gallegos attempt to analogize the award of attorneys fees in a trespass case to a 
similar award for breach of written warranty of title in real estate conveyance cases. 
However, none of the cases cited by Gallegos lend any support for their cause. Gallegos' 
most recent case of Holmes Development v. Cook, (48 P.3d 895, 2002 UT 38), concerned 
an action for breach of covenants and warranties of written conveyance instruments. 
Without citing to any Utah law, and without making any holding in that case or awarding 
any attorneys fees, the Court there included attorneys fees required to establish title as a 
potential element of damages for breach of the covenants of seisin and the right to 
convey. Similarly, Creason v. Peterson, 470 P.2d 403 (Utah 1970) dealt with a breach of 
a warranty within the context of a warranty deed conveyance. The Court there held that 
the grantee had a right to rely on the express statutory warranty of the grantor made to the 
grantee and was entitled to such attorneys fees only as were reasonably necessary to cure 
4 
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the defect in title. Unlike Gallegos' award, there was no judicial approval given to a 
blanket award of attorneys fees expended to recover all consequential injuries allegedly 
suffered because of the breach of warranty covenant. Finally, the Court in VanCott v. 
Jacklin, 226 P. 460 (Utah 1924) acknowledged the reticence of courts to award attorneys 
fees without an express contractual provision, but allowed an award of attorneys fees 
actually incurred to cure the title defect where there was a breach of warranty of title 
through a written instrument of conveyance. 
Of course, the existence of written instruments between the parties of a real estate 
conveyance differs enormously from the parties here, who had never even met each other, 
let alone negotiated and pledged mutual covenants. Furthermore, the law of contracts 
assumes the existence of certain enforceable obligations between the parties that do not 
exist in tort actions. 
Gallegos must do more than complain about the different applications of damage 
claims in the law of torts and the law of real estate covenants in order to change the 
common law for this and all other American jurisdictions. If the State of Utah desires to 
revise the "American Rule" with regard to the recover ability of attorneys fees in trespass 
actions, it may do so in the same manner that it did in legislatively enacting the Punitive 
Damage statute (Utah Code Annotated Section 78-18-1) unsuccessfully pursued by 
Gallegos at trial. But that responsibility is properly left to the legislature. 
493696.1 
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II. The Trial Court Could Not Properly Award Gallegos Attorneys Fees Under 
U.C.A. § 78-27-56 Because the Lloyds' Defenses Were Meritorious and 
Successful. 
As mentioned in the preceding section, at no time during this matter - from the 
filing of the Complaint until the end of the trial when Judge Kennedy made his oral ruling 
from the bench (Transcript of June 28, 2006 hearing at pages 1-8) - did any of the parties 
or the Judge make any allegation, mention or prayer for an award of attorneys fees under 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56. No such cause of action nor prayer for relief was 
included in Gallegos5 Complaint or Amended Complaint. As a matter of fact, Gallegos 
never even made a prayer for attorneys fees under any of their causes of action. The 
itemized schedule of consequential damages requested in Gallegos' Amended Complaint 
(R. 137-138) and initial Trial Brief (R. 200) omitted any mention of attorney's fees. In 
their Supplemental Trial Brief, they included argument supporting their new claim for 
punitive damages, but failed to request any award of attorneys fees. Only at the end of the 
Court's oral announcement of his ruling at the end of the trial, was the potential hook of 
"bad faith" attorneys fees first raised - and then by Gallegos' attorney as an alternative 
legal argument for the unsupportable consequential damages award discussed above. 
(Transcript of June 28, 2006 hearing at page 7, lines 13 through 19). 
Section 78-27-56 allows a court to award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines "that the action or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought in good faith." (Emphasis added). No contest or affirmative defense was 
ever made by Lloyds in response to the claim of the actual trespass caused by the 
6 
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encroachment of the Lloyds home of no more than 8 feet over the common property line 
onto the Gallegos property. Until the end of May 2006, all of the litigation efforts were 
directed to the determination of the extent of the damages suffered by Gallegos because 
of the encroachment. Like all of the pre-trial discovery, the court-ordered mediation was 
concerned exclusively with the amount which should be recoverable at trial. 
Once Gallegos were allowed to file an Amended Complaint, seeking not an award 
of attorneys fees, but for punitive damages, a concerted effort was made by the parties to 
assert and defend, respectively, Gallegos' new claim that Lloyds had committed "willful 
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct", or conduct that manifested a 
"knowing and reckless indifference toward the rights of the Gallegos." (See Utah Code 
Ann. §78-18-1). 
The basic ruling of the trial court was a victory for Lloyds. The major triumph was 
their defeat of the potentially devastating punitive damage claim. Judge Kennedy 
declared that he could not find by clear and convincing evidence that Lloyds had 
committed acts that would have supported an award of punitive damages. (See Transcript 
of June 28, 2006 hearing at page 4). Lloyds were also successful in reducing the amounts 
requested for actual damages by Gallegos by almost half. They had always acknowledged 
that there were some damages that would be required at their hands and had endeavored 
in pre-trial efforts to settle. The actual damages awarded were approximately halfway 




This Court has often enunciated the requirements of an award of attorneys fees 
under section 78-27-56. "According to the plain language of section 78-27-56, three 
requirements must be met before the court shall award attorneys fees: (1) the party must 
prevail. (2) the claim asserted by the opposing party must be without merit, and (3) the 
claim must not be brought or asserted in good faith." Hermes v. Park's Sportsman, 813 
P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah App. 1991). In this case, it is clear that Gallegos did not prevail 
on their punitive damage claim and only partially so on their claims for actual damages. 
The defense asserted by Lloyds to the punitive damage claim must have been with merit 
or the trial court would have ruled otherwise. Gallegos did not appeal that Finding. The 
award of actual damage must be considered, at worst, a draw. Notwithstanding the trial 
court's finding of a lack of good faith in Lloyds' defense, it cannot award attorneys fees 
under the statute if the defenses were, in fact, meritorious and successful. (See Hatch v. 
Boulder Town Council, 21 P.3d 245, 249, 2001 UT App. 55). 
Very instructive on this issue is the discussion of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993). There the trial court 
awarded attorneys fees to the plaintiff on the basis of section 78-27-56, which plaintiff 
had plead in her complaint. There, although the trial court failed to make appropriate 
findings required under the statute to support such an award, the Court reverse the award 
declaring: 
. . . even assuming that defendants asserted their defenses in bad faith, 
nothing in the record supports the conclusion that the defense was without 
merit. A defense lacks merit when it is "frivolous" or "of little weight or 
8 
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importance, having no basis in law or fact." [citations omitted] The point at 
which plaintiff should have mitigated her damages is a legitimate issue and 
can hardly be characterized as frivolous or as having no basis in law or fact. 
Section 78-27-56, therefore does not provide a basis for the award of 
attorney rs fees 
Broadwater, 854 P.2d at 534. Besides the successful defense against the punitive damage 
claim, Lloyds also asserted mitigation of damage defenses to Gallegos claims of actual 
damages, which defenses were in part, approved and adopted by Judge K ennedy (See 
Transcupl of Jinie ,!K, ?(HH Iirm'inj', al p;ige ? line l(» Ihinujjji page \ line l>i it hulyy 
Kennedy failed to award any amount for the contested claim of loss of view suffered by 
the Gallegos property in the amount of more than $19,000 00 fK 1 ^ 
- v. .. .> .»eicn^ ;. A in. . . : i<a a question ^ i 
i mi i| r . ,i' < • ' < s t.g Je Si • ' ?f ''•• * 1 l I\?d 2i»\2u3 
(Utah ' »•'-• SL.,
 A/. Iliis Court ,s empowered and obligated to examine the trial court's 
judgement for correctness and to look behind the trial court's after-the-fact attem.pt to 
substantiate a last minute snpnul '-M an ;tnan 1 ol J((OIIIC)S lees l»> examining whether 
l l ^ d- ! J ' * *' thout merit. 
In an interesting trespass case wherein the trespass was found to have occurred, 
this Court, affirmed the trial com t's refusal to grant either punitive damages or Section 
whether or not defendant's defense was asserted in "good faith" because it cannot be said 
that it was 'without merit.' The record indicates, at great length, that the court's 
493696.1 
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reasoning why defendant's conduct evidences some merit." Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 
1052, 1054 (Utah App. 1987). 
In their Brief, Gallegos attempt to minimize Lloyds' success at trial by comparing 
their efforts to other less meritorious litigants. In Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 
1206 (Utah App. 1997), this Court acknowledged that a defendant who prevailed on a 
single counterclaim "non-material" breach claim, would not be entitled to use that 
technical breach as a shield from an award of section 78-27-56 attorneys fees requested 
by the plaintiff. That holding was based largely on the fact that the defendant failed in his 
defense to all other claims brought by the plaintiff against him. The Court then further 
declared that the "defendant's pattern of ignoring court orders . . . cannot be condoned" 
and then affirmed the trial court's order of "attorneys fees for only those fees incurred in 
defending unmeritorious claims." Id at 1211. 
Unlike the Coalville case, Lloyds had disregarded no court order. There was no 
finding of impropriety in the presentation of the Lloyd's defenses other than the trial court 
finding that portions of Mr. Lloyd's testimony lacked credibility to support his factual 
assertions. None of those credibility lapses provided any support for Gallegos' successful 
claims for damages. The only specific Finding wherein Judge Kennedy declared that 
Lloyds' testimony lacked credibility went exclusively to the issue of the punitive damage 
claim for which Lloyds were ultimately successful. (See Finding No. 14 concerning 
Lloyd's awareness of differences of home's actual location from that depicted on the site 
plan and Lloyd's reliance on survey professional to stake the lot correctly). 
10 
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Similarly, by citing the ruling in Topik i >. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1987), 
Gallegos attempt to paint Lloyds with u^ same oi ,;,*,; ... v • t .-. 
to avoid liability by testifying falsely." The trial court made an affirmative finding that 
the "willful falsehoods" within defendant's testimony, as verified by the defendant's 
secretary, were sufficient to support a finding of bad faith \ dditionall} ,, the defendant' s 
defenses were held to be < v ithc I it n lei it and he faile d in the assertion of each contested 
point. 
Unlike the Topik case, Judge Kennedy did not make a finding that Lloyds had 
uttered any ^ illnil lalseltoocls ' I line is a huge tliilieinuee between nut In ui!11 t tedilili 
and willfi illy testifying false!)/ One lias to do with believability. The other concerns 
perjury when testimony is given under oath. No perjury claim against Lloyds was made 
by the trial court. Furthermore, the de lemiani m / <.>/<* lost each defense he asserted. 
lose the case, assert unmeritorious claims or defenses, and do so in bad faith. (See Hermes 
v. Park 's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221, 1225). 
Having success!un> a^iLaiLA ;;K. ^UWM^,; manage claim anc .-,:,;;,Lanu.; ,:v 




III. Gallegos are not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys Fees on Appeal. 
Gallegos close their Brief by requesting an award of attorneys fees on appeal based 
on Section 78-27-56. For the reasons set forth above, such an award would be improper 
and contrary to the law of this State. The mere fact that a trial court granted bad faith 
attorneys fees is not conclusory that the same should be awarded on appeal. Even on 
appeal, "our statutes allow a court to 'award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and 
not brought or asserted in good faith.' [Citation omitted] Not being persuaded that the 
appeal in this case was without merit or not brought in good faith, we deny Christensen's 
request for attorneys fees." Christensen v. Abbot, 671 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1983). 
Contrary to the "well established" rule cited in Gallegos Brief, this Court has also 
affirmed a trial court's award of attorneys fees under Section 78-27-56, but declined 
awarding them on appeal. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 205 (Utah App. 1991). 
This appeal is not an appropriate case for an award of bad faith attorneys fees. 
Lloyds have presented a meritorious argument for reversal based upon binding law in this 
State and uncontroverted results of the lower court's ruling. Accordingly, Lloyds 
respectfully request that this Court decline any award of attorneys fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's award of attorney fees is not supportable either as consequential 
damages or under Utah Code § 78-27-56. Furthermore, because this Court is under the 
same standard for awarding attorneys fees on appeal, no fees should be awarded to 
12 
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Gallegos for this appeal. Lloyds respectfully request that the trial court's order awarding 
1 he I j a I legos attorneys' fees in both the Judgment and Deci ee and the Supplen lei ital 
Judgment, be re \ - ei sed 
DATED: August 30, 2007 CA I I JSTER NEBEKER & McCULLOliGH 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
James and Julie Lloyd 
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